What are the electoral consequences of tackling poverty with Conditional Cash Transfer programs? I present evidence that cash transfers contingent upon investments on children's education, nutrition and health foster pro-incumbent support and increase turnout. The evidence comes from the pioneering Progresa, the Mexican CCT. Experimental data shows that full enrollment in the program twenty-one months before the 2000 presidential election, compared to enrollment in the program six months prior to the election, lead to an increase in turnout of seven percent and an increase in incumbent vote share of sixteen percent. A comparison between experimental precincts and precincts excluded from the program by the time of the election using propensity score methods reveals that the longer exposure to the program is responsible for the increases in turnout and incumbent vote share. These results are not consistent with theories of clientelism and vote buying. Instead, the data suggests that Progresa increased turnout and incumbent vote share mainly due to retrospective voting.
I. Introduction
During the last 15 years, poverty relief programs have undergone significant transformation throughout the developing world. The transition started in the late-1990s when some countries in Latin America adopted Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCT) to mitigate the social costs of macroeconomic adjustment. CCT are highly redistributive and targeted policies aimed at increasing access of low-income groups to education and health services (Mares and Carnes 2009) . CCT innovative feature is that transfers are contingent upon investments on children's education, health and nutrition. Although these new social policies were first introduced by pro-free market governments in Mexico and Brazil, 2 currently at least thirty governments from all sides of the ideological spectrum have adopted a CCT, including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Uncovering the effect of enrollment in a CCT on a person's likelihood of turning out to vote, or their vote choice, presents some challenges. Program recipients are unlike program non-recipients in observable, and perhaps unobservable ways. Thus comparing recipients and non-recipients will conflate the impact of the program with pre-existing differences, such as poverty, that also affect electoral behavior. Without exogenous variation in program enrollment, an empirical analysis could establish a correlation between this type of social policy and participation, at best. Moreover, since most CCT operate in countries where vote buying and clientelism are prevalent, the possibility that funds are allocated using electoral criteria not only compromises causal inference, but reinforces the view in some policy and academic circles that regardless of the specific characteristics of a program, targeting the poor is part of a political strategy to win votes (Tobin and Kosack 2009 ).
Often social policies are indiscriminately classified as an exchange between a politician and a voter whereby material favors are offered in return for political support (Colburn 2002 ).
Along with this classification comes the assumption that such funds are an effective strategy to win votes but are a threat to democracy. For instance, talking about the Mexican CCT, Cornelius (2004) concluded that the only explanation for a CCT recipient to cast her vote in favor of the incumbent party was that she must have felt coerced or threatened. Yet in the distributive politics literature, the impact of voting on the allocation of government spending receives more attention than the reverse. Thus, the extent to which, and the reasons why, CCT shape electoral behavior remain unknown.
To overcome these challenges, I employ a unique experiment conducted in the early stages of the Mexican Education, Health, and Nutrition Program (Progresa), one of the first and largest CCT. 3 Progresa is often cited in international forums as an example of a successful CCT program. The empirical strategy in this article draws on the fact that 505 villages were randomly treated either twenty-one months or six months before the 2000 presidential election. The long and short durations of the treatment offer the opportunity to estimate the causal effect of the program on turnout and the direction of the vote since enrollment in either group is not correlated to other factors that shape voting behavior, such as poverty or past voting behavior.
The experimental data reveals that early enrollment in Progresa lead to a seven percent increase in turnout and a sixteen percent increase in incumbent vote share. A comparison using propensity score methods between the experimental precincts and a third group of precincts excluded from the program by the time of the election shows that the increases in turnout and incumbent support are driven by the longer exposure to the program while the shorter exposure had no effect.
Progresa's electoral returns could be explained through various channels, including conventional explanations based on clientelism, differential cost of voting among recipients and non-recipients and retrospective voting. The design of the experiment allows to disentangle some of the alternative explanations for these patters because the two treatment groups received cash transfers, but the longer exposure to the program translated into health and education improvements. The data suggest that clientelism does not account for the increase in turnout and incumbent gains observed among recipients. Instead, the results are compatible with retrospective voting.
Rigorous empirical study of CCTs electoral returns is just beginning. Diaz-Cayeros et al. CCTs using regression discontinuity designs. With these designs, electoral returns can be calculated by comparing villages around the eligibility threshold. This empirical strategy, however, faces the challenge that around the discontinuity point data may be sparse. While expanding the interval around the eligibility threshold would increase precision, it would also increase the probability of bias (Green et al 2009) . This article is the first to provide estimates of CCT electoral returns using experimental data. This article's evidence of a pro-incumbent effect contributes to a growing literature on social policy in the developing world, where our understanding of the variation in the design of social protection and the political factors behind them remains limited (Mares and Carnes 2009 94) . It is evident, however, that CCT ability to foster support for the incumbent explains, in part, the fact that left and right leaning governments have found this particular type of social policy attractive. More generally, this article speaks to the literature on the politics of welfare programs, where there is no consensus on the relationship between enrollment in welfare and political participation. For instance, the US experience shows that enrollment in some welfare programs leads to an increase in political participation presumably to protect or expand benefits (Campbell 2003, Mettler and Soss 2004 ), but enrollment in other programs stigmatizes recipients and lowers their sense of internal efficacy (Soss 1999 ).
This paper proceeds as follows. The following section describes the program. Section III includes the empirical strategy, data, and variables. Section IV presents the results from comparing the early and late treatment groups using the experimental data. Section V reports the results when comparing the experimental groups with a third control group weighted by the probability of being part of the experiment. Section VI explores the external validity of the experimental results with a municipal level analysis of the impact of program coverage on turnout and incumbent vote shares in 2000 and 2006. Section VII asks why would a CCT shape electoral behavior. I explore the alternative mechanisms behind Progresa's impact and set out an agenda for research in CCT electoral returns. Finally, Section VIII concludes.
II. Progresa
The peso crisis of 1995 caused the Mexican GDP to shrank by seven percent and private consumption by twelve percent. The population living in poverty increased from fifty-two percent in 1994 to almost sixty-nine percent in 1996. More than sixteen million people fell into poverty (Gil Díaz and Carstens 1996) . The economic crisis hit the hardest in rural areas where poverty increased from thirty-seven to fifty-two percent, while in urban areas it increased from ten to twenty-six percent. 4 At that time, Mexico's federal government ran fifteen food subsidy programs: four were generalized and eleven were targeted at different urban and rural populations. These programs were operated by ten distinct ministries or agencies, and varied in coverage and size (Levy 2006) . Despite the fact that poverty was especially prevalent in rural areas, seventy-five percent of the total budget for existing poverty relief programs was channeled to urban areas. "In fact, over half of the total budget was absorbed by the generalized bread and tortilla subsidies in the urban areas, where most of the income transfer was captured by non-poor households... In 1995 close to sixty percent of all poor rural families received no food support at all from government" (Levy 2006: 6) .
In 1994, the most influential anti-poverty program in place, the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL), was decentralized and used citizen participation as a central element in project selection, funding and implementation. This community based and demand driven program "achieved a high profile, however, was susceptible to local political influences" (Skoufias et al. 1999 ). Moreover, this program was characterized as a clientelistic program that fostered pro-PRI electoral dynamics without efficiently reducing poverty. 5 Responding to this context, Progresa began operating in 1997 in the administration of President Ernesto Zedillo. The program delivers cash transfers to the female heads of poor households in rural communities with the objective of breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty by promoting investments on children's education, health and nutrition.
Unlike previous Mexican programs which funneled resources through the education and health sectors, Progresa aims to increase the demand for such services by transferring cash directly to households. The program consists of three complementary components: a cash transfer, primarily intended to subsidized food expenditure. This transfer comes with a nutritional supplement targeted to children between the ages of four months and two years and pregnant and lactating women; a scholarship, intended to compensate for the opportu-nity cost of child labor, thus enabling children to stay in school; and basic health care for all members of the household with particular emphasis on preventive health care (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1997) . 6 areas and expanded to the semi-urban areas using parallel criteria to select recipients. In 6 Interventions in the health service package include: basic sanitation, family planning, prenatal, childbirth and puerperal care, vaccinations, prevention and treatment of diarrhea, antiparasite treatment, prevention and treatment of respiratory infections, tuberculosis, high blood pressure and diabetes mellitusm and first aid for injuries (Parker and Teruel 2005) . Compared to previous programs based on general subsidy schemes, Progresa is more redistributive. In 1994, the highest and lowest income deciles benefited from the main food subsidy at almost the same rate, six and seven percent respectively. In contrast, the highest income decile does not benefit from Progresa's food component, whereas the lowest decile received thirty-five percent of it (Scott 2001) .
Besides the innovative use of conditionalities, three characteristics set Progresa apart from other poverty relief programs in Mexico. First, Progresa's operational rules are explicitly non-partisan. The program has clear and fixed criteria for determining eligibility, as oppose to political considerations. These criteria are based on a geographical measure of poverty constructed from census data and household income surveys. The resources of the program and the formula to allocate them are described in detail in the federal budget, which is proposed by the executive but approved in the Chamber of Deputies. 7 The provisions in the federal budget decree explicitly prohibited the use of the program to proselytize by any political party. Since 1998, all documents, materials, and forms that reach recipients have been required to include the following text:
We remind you that your participation in Progresa and receipt of benefits are in no way subject to affiliation with any specific political party or to voting for any specific candidate running for public office. No candidate is authorized to grant or withhold benefits under the program. Eligible beneficiary families will receive support if they show up for their doctor's visits and health education talks and if their children attend school regularly. Any person, organization, 7 In 1997, the seventy-year ruling party (PRI) lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Despite strong pressures from ministers who controlled the existing programs at that time, the coordinator of the Progresa agency was designated directly by the president. A committee made up of representatives from the ministries of Education, Health, and Social Development was also appointed; however, this committee had no capacity to compensate these ministries, either politically or financially. Unlike previous administrators of prominent poverty relief programs who were mostly politicians, the first coordinator of Progresa, Gómez de León, was a scientist. 8 Finally, Progresa was insulated from the temptation to disproportionately increase the list of beneficiaries close to election time. Although the program was ready to be launched in January 1997, its operation was delayed until August, one month after the midterm elections of that year. This practice was continued by including in the budget decrees of 8 Gómez de León was trained as a demographer on the Catholic University of Leuven, Harvard, and Princeton. Prior to Progresa, he had been the director of Conapo. And before that, he had coordinated the department of Demography of the Center for Economic and Demographic Studies at el Colegio de Mexico. Perhaps Gómez de León group's most important field experience was a birth control campaign that did not have the double objective of delivering resources to poor households and fostering political support for the incumbent party. As one of the members of his group explained: It was complicated enough to talk about sex and birth control methods to people in the rural areas, they did not wish to ask them for their vote on top of that (author's interview, Mexico city, August 2005). In terms of education, enrollment rates in primary school were already high before the program and enrollment rates often fall dramatically in secondary school especially for girls. Thus Progresa's largest impact was reported on children who entered secondary school. For girls the increase in enrollment rates was twenty percent, and for boys it was ten percent (Parker and Teruel 2005) . This additional education means that children, when becoming adults, will have higher permanent income by approximately 8 percent (Schultz 2001 ).
Furthermore, the increase in enrollment due to Progresa is higher than the increase that would have been produced by the construction of additional secondary schools which is estimated to be 0.46 for girls and 0.34 for boys (Coady 2000) .
III. Calculating Progresa's Electoral Returns
Estimating the effects of enrollment in Progresa on support for the then ruling party (PRI) presents some challenges. Program recipients are unlike program non recipients in observable (and perhaps unobservable ways). Thus comparing people enrolled in the program and people not enrolled will conflate the impact of the program with pre-existing differences. This is specially troublesome for the study of Progresa because the characteristics that set program recipients apart, such as poverty, are traits that also affect electoral behavior. After all, in 1997 the historic correlation between poverty, rural residence, and support for the PRI remained strong. To asses the effects of Progresa on electoral behavior, this article uses the randomized component of the program implemented in its early phases originally designed to evaluate program effects on schooling, nutrition and health. The random allocation of treatment provides a justification for causal inference (Green and Gerber 2003) .
Randomization.
The program evaluation was carried out by program officials in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) between 1998 and 2000. The ran-domized experiment was implemented in seven states where the program was first scaled up. 9 The experimental sample was drawn from the universe of eligible villages within these states. The sample selection process followed Progresa's targeting method closely. The first step was the selection of villages eligible to the program based on a poverty measure created with the 1990 census data and the 1995 partial census data. This poverty measure took into account educational levels, access to potable water and electricity, sewage coverage, etc. A threshold for eligibility was established allowing it to vary by broad geographical regions. The poverty index was divided into five categories that go from very low poverty to low, medium, high, and very high. Localities deemed to have a high or very high degree of poverty were considered priorities to be included in the program.
The second step was a result of the program's conditionalities. Since the program required the use of school and health services, additional criteria for selecting the experimental sample was based on geographic location, distance between localities, and the existence of health and school infrastructure. Those localities with access to school and health services or with available roads when the services were not located in the same community were considered eligible. In addition, localities with less than fifty or more than 2500 inhabitants were excluded. Finally, using Geographic Information System software, remaining localities were grouped based on geographical proximity using a routine that identified relatively isolated communities. The isolated localities were also excluded from the selection process (Progresa, 1998).
Randomization was implemented at the village level using a stratified sample by population. The final sample was drawn from a universe of 6,396 eligible villages. Families in 320 villages were randomly selected to receive benefits on September 1998, whereas 186 villages were excluded from the program until January 2000 (Schultz 2001 ). There was a sixty percent probability of being assigned to the early treatment group and a forty percent probability of being assigned to the late treatment group. In villages assigned to early treatment, all eligible households within each village, identified by the Household Socio-economic Characteristics Survey(ENCASEH), were offered enrollment in Progresa and normally ac- Data. 10 According to the program's operational rules, after eligible households had been identified, the list of beneficiaries was presented to community assemblies. Their feedback was used to correct any inclusion or exclusion errors. Yet, this stage of selection was in practice irrelevant both for the experiment and the large scale operation of the program. As of 2000 "the number of households whose selection into Progresa was disputed at this stage of the selection process was minute (0.1 percent of the total number of selected households)" (Skoufias et al. 1999 ).
As in many countries, in Mexico, election results are not reported at the village level.
Instead, election outcomes are reported at levels defined by the electoral law. Thus, to take advantage of the random assignment to treatment, I overlayed the 505 experimental villages to the smallest unit of outcome measure for which census, program, and electoral data roughly coincide: the sección electoral (precinct). 11 Neither villages nor precincts have fixed population size and generally they do not correspond one to one.
Because the unit of assignment to treatment and the unit of outcome measure do not overlap perfectly, the aggregation of villages into precincts brought in villages that were originally excluded from the experimental sample. 12 The 421 precincts that correspond to the experimental villages were in average more populous. In terms of poverty, however, the experimental villages and precincts remain very similar, with villages having an average poverty of 4.66 and precincts of 4.61 on a scale that goes from 1 to 5. The average share of a precinct's population living in an eligible village was .90. 13 To denote treatment status at the village level, a dummy variable taking the value of one when the village is part of the early treatment group and zero otherwise is sufficient. At the precinct level, however, (because precincts are more populous than villages) treatment status must be accompanied by a fractional response variable that captures the density of the treatment. Summary statistics of villages and precincts are presented in Table 1. 11 IFE and INEGI use different identifiers for states, municipalities and villages so all merges were done by hand based on the villages names. Names of the villages were taken from the evaluation survey, ENCASEH 1997. Out of the 505 villages in the experiment, eight of them disappeared by the time of the 2000 Census. The remaining experimental villages were located in 465 precincts. 12 The precincts with experimental villages included 3500 additional villages. INEGI records did not include 440 of the additional villages. For this reason, eighteen precincts had insufficient information to calculate their population and their poverty levels. Additionally five precincts disappeared after the 1996 redistricting process. Thus, these precincts were excluded from the analysis. In order to minimize measurement error, I retain precincts with 3000 inhabitants or less. This restriction eliminates 21 precincts that are outliers in terms of poverty levels and population size. As robustness checks, I also estimated all the models of the following sections using the full sample of precincts, I get practically identical results. Among the remaining precincts, forty-two corresponded one-to-one to their experimental village. Twenty precincts had between seventy-five and ninety-nine percent of their population living in randomly assigned villages. Forty-one precincts had between fifty-one and seventy-five percent of their population living in randomly assigned villages. One hundred and nine precincts had between twenty-six and fifty percent of their population living in randomly assigned villages. Finally, two hundred fifty-three precincts had between zero and twenty-five percent of their population living in an experimental village. 13 To replicate the eligibility criteria I used the same Poverty Index (1995) used by program officials. Following the original randomization process, I defined a village as eligible if it scored a four or higher in the measure of poverty and had a population larger than 50 but smaller than 2500 inhabitants.
For the original randomization, Behrman and Todd (1999) show that villages in the late treatment group are a valid counterfactual for villages in the early treatment group as there are no systematical differences between them in terms of population size, age distribution, education levels, access to health services, and income. Once villages are aggregated into precincts, randomization still implies that assignment to receive early Progresa benefits is exogenous and, in principle, the baseline characteristics of the early and late treatment group should be balanced so that the late treatment group remains a reliable counterfactual for the early treatment group.
The data supports these claims. When comparing the baseline characteristics of the early and late treatment groups at the precinct level, there is no statistically significant differences between them in terms of demographic traits such as poverty, population, population living in an eligible village, even at the 10% significance level.
If Progresa was a vote buying strategy, its distribution would reveal some form of electoral bias. The data gives no evidence of this as there are no differences between early and late treatment groups in terms of pre-program electoral behavior ( Table 2, The reason to measure these variables with respect to potential voters, as opposed to with respect to registered voters, is that the program asked the female head of the household for an identification. Since one of the most commonly used identification cards is the one issued by the Electoral Institute, then enrollment in the program could have the automatic effect of increasing the number of registered voters. 14 The main independent variables are treatment, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the precinct includes villages from the early treatment group and zeros when the precinct includes villages in the late treatment group. Dosage is a continuous variable that indicates the share of a precinct's voters that live in randomly assigned villages. When treatment = 1, then treatment * dosage is the fraction of the precinct that was treated early.
As Table 2 shows, the baseline characteristics of precincts in the early and late treatment are balanced. Even so, the analysis in the next sections includes three types of covariate adjustments. First, all models include population changes and share of the precinct's population eligible to the program to take into account that the original randomization was stratified by population. 15 Second, as a robustness check, some of the specifications include state fixed effects. This set of variables take into account the fact that the education and health sectors are operated locally. Thus even if Progresa's cash transfers were standardized, the quality of the education and health services varied greatly from state to state.
Finally, some specifications include the party at the local government in 1994 and 2000 to account for any differences caused by local political dynamics even though local government were circumscribed by Progresa. 16 Mostly, the effect of including covariates is to increase the precision of the estimates.
IV.Results.
Because of randomization, consistent estimates of Progresa's causal effect can be calculated by a difference-in-difference estimator. In this case, because there are only two time periods, 1994 and 2000, a fixed effects and a first differences model produce identical results. 16 Data on local elections was collected from the Center for Research on Development (CIDAC). 17 I estimate a first-difference regression model. Turnout in a precinct can be written as: Table 3 presents the results when turnout is the dependent variable. To start, the effect of being in the early treatment group, as oppose to the late treatment group, is increasing in its dosage. In other words, the interaction of early enrollment in Progresa and dosage has a positive and significant effect on turnout. Once the party in control of the municipality and state fixed effects are included, the estimates suggest that full enrollment in the program twenty-one months before the election lead to an .05 percentage point increase in turnout (adding the main and interaction effects), significant at the five percent level (Column 3).
Since in the late treatment group only 65 percent of people older than 18 voted, the effect of full enrollment in the early treatment group represents a 7 percent increase in voter turnout.
Did Progresa foster pro-incumbent support? Table 4 Turning to the causal effect of the program on the vote share of the two main opposition parties in 2000, Progresa had no effect on the right wing party, PAN (Column 6), but early enrollment in the program lead to a .05 decrease on PRD's vote share, significant at the where y it is turnout, β0 is the intercept, treatment and Dosage are defined as described above. ci captures unobserved characteristics of the precinct that are constant over time, and year2 is a dummy variable that equals one for the post-program year, 2000. By doing a first-difference transformation, the unobserved but constant characteristics (ci) are eliminated and the intercept gets differenced away.
where ∆y = yit − yit−1. Treatment, dosage and their interaction are not differenced because in 1994 no precinct was incorporated in the program, so the change in this share is simply the share in 2000. θ2 becomes the intercept in the differenced equation. The estimate of main interest is β3. After estimating equation (3) with changes in turnout as the dependent variable, I estimated a specification equivalent to equation ( There are a couple of issues related to the evaluation design and program operation that make the latter story worth while to consider. First, to measure health and education outcomes, the evaluation carried out repeated interviews in the early and late groups.
Interviewers had the mandate of not revealing that the surveys were related to Progresa In such case, the late treatment group could have inferred that they were the losers of the randomization. Thus results in the previous section are insufficient to determine if the early treatment group turned out more or the late treatment group turned out less. Similarly, the interpretation regarding changes in incumbent vote share is inconclusive. Moreover, the estimates in the previous section are illustrative when comparing the short and long duration of the treatment, yet they do not shed light to the effect of Progresa on recipients compared to non-recipients.
A way to determine if the early treatment turned out more or the late treatment turned out less, is to find a reliable control group that was not enrolled in the program at the time of the 2000 presidential election and was not affected by the experimental evaluation.
The original experimental groups were taken from the universe of 6,396 eligible villages.
From these population, 320 villages were randomly selected to be enrolled in the early treatment group, 186 were randomly enrolled in the late treatment group and, by default, To construct this third group, I followed a similar procedure than before. First, I
matched all eligible villages to their electoral precincts. Second, I kept in the analysis precincts that had not received program benefits by the time of the 2000 presidential election. Finally, to be consistent, I kept precincts with 3000 inhabitants or less. Table 5 presents baseline characteristics of randomized and third groups and the regression adjusted difference between them. Precincts in the third group are comparable to precincts in the experiment in terms of poverty levels, share of the population living in eligible villages, PRI vote share and PAN vote share. Precincts in the third group are, however, less populous than precincts in the experiment, have less turnout and vote less for the left-wing party (Column 3). These differences indicate an unbalance in baseline traits. To balance the distribution of baseline traits, the probability that a precinct is in the randomized group ( P), as oppose to the third group, was calculated as a function of baseline characteristics. Then, observations in the third group are weighted by P/(1 − P ).
The probability weights correct the unbalance in observable baseline characteristics. Column 4 shows that in the re-weighted sample, there are no statistically significant differences between the randomized and third groups.
With these weights it is now possible to estimate the effect of early and late treatment relative to a control group. Table 6 These estimates corroborate that early enrollment in the program increases turnout and incumbent vote share. On the other hand, these estimates suggest that enrollment in the late treatment group had no statistically significant effect in electoral behavior relative to being a non-recipient.
VI. External validity and Progresa's effect in 2006
The empirical strategy of this article has as main advantage that the random assignment Finally, Progresa's experiment is better suited to study short-term effect. Since both early and late treatment groups were enrolled in the program, the differences in electoral behavior due to the program are bounded to disappear. Therefore, the experimental data cannot answer wether Progresa had the same mobilization and pro-incumbent effect in the 2006 presidential election when the incumbent party was the PAN.
To explore wether the program had similar effects outside of the experimental sample and to find a preliminary estimate of its effect in the 2006 presidential election, this section explores the relationship between Progresa and electoral behavior using two cross-sections of municipal level data. Table 7 
VII. Discussion
The argument that poverty relief programs demobilize recipients due to the stigma that comes from collecting public assistance (Soss 1999 Why Progresa had such electoral returns? There are several of Progresa's components and traits that could be responsible for the increased turnout and pro-incumbent effects.
Proving a particular mechanism, however, is a daunting task. On one hand, one of Progresa's strengths is that its operation is standardized. This means that there is no exogenous variation in program components to evaluate them separately. At the household level,
where there is variation in exposure to components, this variation is likely to be product of a systematic selection process. For instance, households that fail to bring their children to medical check ups but keep them at school, benefit from the scholarship and not the nutrition-related cash stippled. This type of household, however, is likely to be different to households that comply with all conditionalities. Moreover, this difference could be related to political outcomes in some way, rendering causal estimates implausible. Ideally to get a better sense of the mechanism, we could design experimental interventions where different combinations of Progresa's components are randomly manipulated. Alas, not only the current coverage of Progresa makes this research strategy difficult to implement, but changing program traits for the sake of evaluating different causal mechanisms, even in the field of education and health, has not been feasible (Todd and Wolpin 2006) . In this section, I
begin to eliminate some of the possible mechanisms behind Progresa's electoral effects that seem to be inconsistent with this article's data and discuss some other channels that seem to be at work.
To explain Progresa's electoral dynamics, the cash transfer is perhaps the most obvious mechanism. When putting together cash and votes in the same sentence, inevitably vote buying and clientelism come to mind. Indeed, accusations along these lines were not uncommon in the beginning of the 2000 presidential race. Progresa was described by some in the left-wing party as a "disguised twin of Pronasol that has as its main goal the perpetuation of electoral clientelism among the poorest" (Servicio Universal de Noticias, August 8, 1997).
More specifically, opposition parties accused the PRI of threatening program recipients to discontinue the program if they failed to cast a ballot in favor of the party.
Is vote buying responsible for the increased turnout and incumbent vote share? In order to answer this question, the first thing to note is that program benefits were explicitly uncon- Several women recipients mentioned that, although it took some time for them to feel comfortable, discussions about local needs were not uncommon in these meetings. Indeed, in some cases, women presented these needs to the local government. 20 An additional program's trait that could shape political behavior is the selection in each village of three women that are in charge of informing the community about events related to the program.
Despite the lack of formal organization, this network has allowed women, in some instances, to enter politics. 21 . 
